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A POLITICAL THEORY OF POLITICAL
TRIALS
RONALD CHRISTENSON*
Are political trials necessary? Do they reflect something about the
nature of politics and law which makes them inevitable in every society?
Or, are political trials a disease of both politics and law? Predictably,
totalitarian regimes employ political trials-some sensational, most secret-in order to accomplish the obvious ends of total power: the total
control of a total population. Stalin's purge trials and the Nazi Peoples'
Court were juridical nightmares, demonstrating that corrupted absolute
power tends toward absolute self-justification. Do such "trials" have
anything in common with other trials which must also be called political, including the Wounded Knee trial, the trials of the Boston Five, the
Chicago Seven, and the Berrigan brothers, or even of Galileo, Joan of
Arc, and Socrates? Do political trials make a positive contribution to an
open and democratic society? This Article concludes that they do make
a positive contribution to an open and democratic society. They bring
together for public consideration society's basic contradictions, through
an examination of competing values and loyalties. They are not incompatible with the rule of law, and they are best understood by examining
the questions they raise.
I.

INTRODUCTION

What is a political trial?I Are political trials better classified as law
* Professor of Political Science, Gustavus Adolphus College. Ph.D. University of Minne-

sota, 1965; M.A. University of Minnesota, 1961; B.S. Wisconsin State University at Eau
Claire, 1959.
Presented at the 1982 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual Meeting, Louisville,
Kentucky. Recipient of the Anderson Outstanding Paper Award for 1982. Researched and
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I Attempts to define political trials are valuable, but ultimately unsatisfying. The neardefinitive work, Otto Kirchheimer's Politica/Justice,suggests that political trials are those in
which "the courts eliminate a political foe of the regime according to some prearranged
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or politics? If they are totally political, why have a trial? Since the
courts are part of the "system," are all trials, therefore, political? Or,
because in every political trial the accused is charged with a specific
violation of the criminal code, are no trials political? Is the designation
political trial pejorative, used when justice seems impossible, or is it
merely descriptive, used when more is at stake in a trial than a transgression of the criminal code?
Most attempts to designate a trial aspolitical become mired in the
quicksand of motive, in the argument that the prosecution, the judge,
even the entire court system, is "out to get" the defendant, or conversely,
that the defendant and his lawyers are using the court as a platform in
their program to undermine the legal system and accomplish their political goals. Such judgments are fine instances of the genetic fallacy. Legal and political assessments, when made on a guess at motives, become
quagmires. Motives are always numerous and various, and they generally operate at odds with each other. In both law and politics, however,
we must make judgments. If we refuse to make judgments, believing
that one motive is as good or as bad as another, we will land either in
the cynical position that law is the will of the stronger and therefore all
trials are political trials, or in the naive, Panglossian position that none
are political.
We might sidestep the difficulties of definition by beginning with
the ingenuous assumption that we can recognize political trials when we
see them. If we can point to a number of trials and say with some confidence that these, if any, are political trials, then we might more easily
understand the nature of law and politics that precipitates such trials.
The trial of Socrates for corrupting the youth of Athens and the trial of
Jesus for blasphemy and sedition are most likely to be generally recognized as political trials. We could follow these two classic examples with
others: the Inquisition (both the medieval and Spanish versions), the
1431 trial of Joan of Arc for heresy and witchcraft, the 1534 trial of
Thomas More for "maliciously" remaining silent when asked about
Henry's supremacy in religion, or the 1633 trial of Galileo for heretically
suggesting that the earth moved around the sun, or the many treason
rules." 0. KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUsTIcE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS 6 (1961). See also id. at 46-49, 419; POLITICAL TRIALS xii-xiii (T. Becker ed. 1971);
J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 149 (1964). Both Shklar and Becker follow Kirchheimer's lead. For a
discussion of the range of definitions of political trial, see N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT:

REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW

YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURTROOM CONDUCT ch. 5 (1973); see also AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS 3-16 (M. Belknap ed. 1981); A. TURK, POLITICAL CRIMINALITY (1982);
Friedman, PoliticalPower and Legal Legitimacy, 30 ANTIOCH REv. 157 (1970); Hakman, Political

Trials in the Legal Order, 21 J. PUB. L. 73 (1972); Harper & Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political
Trials, 60 YALE L.J. 1 (1951).
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and seditious libel trials in England's Puritan Revolution. Are there
more certain examples of political trials than the trials of two kings,
Charles I in 1649 or Louis XVI in 1792? Would anyone suggest that the
trial of the Irish patriot, Robert Emmet, or of the treasonist Lord HawHaw (William Joyce) after World War II were not political trials?
What then about the trials of Alfred Dreyfus, Sacco and Vanzetti, or
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg?
These trials, and more, come to mind when political trials are mentioned. Most of the above defendants have come to us in the judgment
of history as heroes unjustly prosecuted. Yet, in each of these cases an
argument can be made that under the circumstances the prosecution
was understandable, even reasonable, and the judgment sensible if not
just.
In 399 B.C., while Athens was recovering from the disastrous Peloponnesian War, the democratic leaders Anytus and Meletus recognized
that Socrates, who had associated with the oligarchic faction, was a
threat to the post-war reconstruction. Two of his students, Alcibiades
and Critias, had been ruthless while in power. Socrates, meanwhile, was
undermining what small faith the youth had in democracy. 2 Likewise,
Jesus presented an internal threat to Rome. Judea was difficult to govern with a mix of nationalist extremists inclined toward terror, such as
the Zealots, and such religious fanatics as the Essenes or the followers of
John the Baptist. The elders in the Sanhedrin, who had authority in
Jewish law, regarded Jesus as a threat to the delicately balanced political relationship with the Roman governors. Further, he was a peril to
the Jewish law. His activities during Passover, driving the merchants
and money-changers from the Temple in Jerusalem, were a forewarning
to both the Sanhedrin and Rome. Removing such a troublemaker and
blasphemer from the scene, one hailed by the mob as "King of Israel
that cometh in the name of the Lord," could be defended as best for the
imperial and the community interests. The full force of Rome, in fact,
3
did move against the next generation in Jerusalem (70 A.D.).
Similar sensible arguments can vindicate other notable political
prosecutions. Joan was given every chance by her examiners to acknowledge that her "voices" were not superior to the authority of the
Church. She was admonished to return to the way of salvation but per,sisted in her heresy.4 The interrogation of Thomas More was designed
2 A. TAYLOR, SOCRATES

ch. III (1932); Stone, 1 F. Stone Breaks the Socrates Stoqy, N.Y.

Times, April 8, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
3 See Matthew 26-27; Mark 14-15; Luke 22-23;John 18-19;see also S. BRANDON, THE TRIAL
OF JESUS OF NAZARETH (1968).
4 W. BARRETT, THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D'ARc 270-79 (1931); 2 A. PAINE, JOAN OF ARC:

MAID OF FRANCE 251-58 (1925).

RONALD CHRISTENSON

[Vol. 74

to secure his compliance, not his execution. Henry VIII and Thomas
Cromwell desired the assent of More, the ex-Chancellor, to the new policy of supremacy and to the revised order of succession after Henry's
marriage to Anne Boleyn. When Henry learned that Pope Paul III had
intervened by elevating More's fellow prisoner, John Fisher, to cardinal,
he exploded. Only then did he set in motion the machinery which led
5
both More and Fisher to their deaths.
Galileo was admonished in 1616 by Cardinal Bellarmine that the
Church expected only obedience, not "absolute assent." He was not forbidden from entertaining his opinions as a probability or from discussing them with his peers. At his 1633 trial it was revealed to Galileo that
even the Inquisitor Firenzuola had "no scruple in holding firmly that
the Earth moves and the Sun stands still." Nevertheless, the issue of the
6
trial was not the scientific truth but the Church's authority.
Charles I had been waging war against Parliament, which tried
him. Louis XVI, likewise, conspired and intrigued with foreign powers
to bring about a war and "be really king again."' 7 Robert Emmet was a
leader in an insurrection which resulted in the assassination of Lord Kilwarden and Colonel Brown. 8 William Joyce collaborated with the Nazi
propaganda machine.9 Charles, Louis, Emmet, and Joyce, in different
ways, all attempted to bring down the state by force.
With the perspective of time, the post-war trials of Dreyfus, Sacco
and Vanzetti, and the Rosenbergs can be seen as products of hysteria:
anti-Semite, anti-foreign, and anti-Communist. Nevertheless, at the
time, highly respected leaders of opinion looked into the cases and put
the weight of their influence behind the convictions. The French General Staff was intractable in its support of the court-martial of Captain
Dreyfus, and the entire French society was divided. France had lost Alsace and Lorraine to Germany; Dreyfus had been born in Alsace, and it
was evident that someone assigned to the General Staff had passed information to the German Military Attach6 Schwartzkoppen. 10 A distinguished committee composed of Harvard President Lowell, M.I.T.
President Stratton, and Judge Grant advised Governor Fuller against
5 G. ELTON, POLICY AND POLICE: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE REFORMATION IN THE
AGE OF THOMAS CROMWELL 400-20 (1972).
6 G. DE SANTILLANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO chs. XI-XII (1955).
7 REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION: SPEECHES AT THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI ch. 5 (M.
Walzer ed. 1974).
8 28 T. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO
THE YEAR 1783, at 1169-78 (London 1809-1826) [hereinafter cited as STATE TRIALS].
9 R. WEST, THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON (1964).
10 A- DREYFUS & P. DREYFUS, THE DREYFUS CASE (1937); N. HALASZ, CAPTAIN DREYFUS:

THE STORY OF A MASs HYSTERIA (1955).
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clemency for Sacco and Vanzetti." The Supreme Court, in a six-tothree decision, refused to stay the execution of the Rosenbergs. 12 President Eisenhower refused clemency, explaining that "the Rosenbergs
have received the benefit of every safeguard which American justice can
provide. . . ". I can only say that, by immeasurably increasing the
chances of atomic war, the Rosenbergs may have condemned to death
tens of millions of innocent people all over the world."' 3 If the passage
of time has brought the consensus of considered opinion to a different
conclusion in each of these cases, we have, after all, the advantage of
historical distance and hindsight.
II.

PARTISAN TRIALS

An initial distinction should be made between those political trials
which are totally unsupported by law and those which, while proceeding with a political as well as a legal agenda, are within the rule of law.
The former, a fraudulent trial, can be called a partisan trial. Partisan
trials are fully within the realm of power and completely outside the
rule of law. The Spanish Inquisition, 14 the Star Chamber under the
Tudors and early Stuarts, Judge Jeffreys of the Bloody Assize during the
English Restoration, 15 and the Jacobin Tribunal during the Reign of
Terror in the French Revolution 16 provide pre-twentieth century
prototypes.
In our century, wars, revolutions and regimes which made war on
their own people in the attempt to thwart revolution make partisan trials prominent. Two examples, one from Nazi Germany and one from
Stalin's regime, furnish clear illustrations.
Hitler and Goering were angered when the German Supreme
Court acquitted three of the four Communist defendants accused of setting the Reichstag Fire in 1933, a fire planned by the Nazis themselves
and ignited by their stormtroopers. The Supreme Court decision led
Hitler and the Nazi leaders to ensure that henceforth jurisdiction over
political crimes, those involving "insidious attacks against the government," were removed from the ordinary courts to Special Courts. In
IIF. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1962); B. JACKSON, BLACK
FLAG: A LOOK BACK AT THE STRANGE CASE OF NICOLE SACCO AND BARTOLOMEO VANZETI (1981); R. MONTGOMERY, SAcCO-VANzETrI: THE MURDER AND THE MYTH (1960);
F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM; THE STORY OF THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE (1971).
12 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
13 W. SCHNEIR & M. SCHNEIR, INvITATION To AN INQUEST 248 (1965).
14 See H. KAMEN, THE SPANISH INQUISITION (1965).
15 See 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 168-80, 411-13

(1883).
16 Ste G. LENOTRE, THE TRIBUNAL OF TERROR: A STUDY OF PARIS IN 1793-1795

(1968); 2 J. THOMPSON, ROBESPIERRE chs. XV-XVI (1968).
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1934 an additional court was established by Hitler and Goering, the
notorious Peoples' Court, controlled by the Nazi Party and the Gestapo.
Clearly instruments of terror and propaganda, five of the seven Peoples'
Court judges were chosen from the Party, the S.S., or the military. Defense lawyers were "qualified" Nazis who seemed resolved to outdo the
prosecution in castigating the accused. The Queen of Hearts, best
known for her shrieks, "sentence first, verdict afterwards," and "off with
her head," was a wise jurist compared with Nazi Judge Roland Freisler.
No appeals were allowed. Rather, Hitler and Goering retained the right
to quash the criminal proceedings in the event the result would be unfavorable. 17 Partisan courts such as the Peoples' Court operate at the
center of propaganda and on the fringe of terror, waging psychological
warfare more against the entire population than against the accused on
trial..
In the trials following the Russian Revolution, continuing throughout the Stalin era, the courts operated on the premise that under the
new revolutionary order the question of guilt was irrelevant. Guilt was
itself declared to be a bourgeois concept, unworthy of the new order of
justice. N.V. Krylenko, the Prosecutor General, sculptured, as he put it,
"a new law and new ethical norms." The tribunal became "an organ of
the class struggle of the workers directed against their enemies," acting
in the "interests of the revolution . . .having in mind the most desirable
results for the masses of workers and peasants." Defendants are "carriers
of specific ideas," and the court must recognize this fact in judging a
defendant: "Only one method of evaluating him is to be applied: evaluation from the point of view of class expediency." Individual guilt is replaced by class expediency. "We protect ourselves," Krylenko
concluded, "not only against the past but also against the future." 1 8
Roland Freisler in Nazi Germany and N.V. Krylenko in Stalin's
U.S.S.R. were mistaken if they thought that their jurisprudence was
new, or that their courts could create a new order. It is more accurate to
say that their legal standard, expediency, was the oldest law. In a crisis
or tyranny it is the most commonplace. In all circumstances it is the
most tedious. It is not new, however. Freisler and Krylenko do not give
us a creative idea about law, only a restatement of the operative motto
of all tyrannies: justice is the interest of the stronger. The people of the
17 G. DIMrrROV, THE REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL (1969); W.

SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL

OF THE THIRD REICH; A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 369-78, 1389-97 (1959); F. TOBIAS,
THE REICHSTAG FIRE (1964).
18 1 A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, 1918-1956; AN EXPERIMENT IN LIT-

ERARY INVESTIGATION 306-09 (1973); see also Fuller, Pashukani and Vyshinsky, 47 MICH. L.
REv. 1157-66 (1949); Powell, The Legal Nihilism of Pashukanis, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 18-32
(1967).
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small island of Melos faced this standard when powerful Athens demanded that they submit or be destroyed. The Athenians stated the
principle Freisler and Krylenko advocated with flat clarity: "The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in
fact the strong do what they9 have the power to do and the weak accept
what they have to accept.'
The one-sidedness of a partisan trial and its lack of contradiction
envelopes it in an ideological wonderland, not too different from what
Alice found. In challenging the prosecution at a partisan trial, the accused stands no chance of seriously contesting the indictment, much less
persuading the court. Nikolai Bukharin, for example, was charged with
leading a conspiratorial group (the Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites) to
sabotage and dismember the U.S.S.R. and undermine its defense capacity. In the 1938 show trial, Bukharin challenged Public Prosecutor Andri Vyshinsky's strategy of using those in the dock to verify the
"evidence" presented during the preliminary investigation. Bukharin
wedged his protest between the demand that he cooperate as a condition for being allowed to appear in court and his desire that he set his
political ideas on record for future generations. Although he was cut
short by Vyshinsky whenever, by way of his confession, he explained his
heretical views, he was the only defendant who refused to play the evil
conspirator role cast for him. Even then, Bukharin was only partially
successful, for, as George Katkov concludes, "In the process he found
himself ensnared in a net of equivocation and ambiguous phrases, so
that instead of defending what he believed to be the truth, he upheld
that most powerful weapon of the very tyranny to which he had fallen
'20
victim-institutionalized mendacity.
The Nazi and Stalinist partisan trials thus provide evidence that
certain political trials take place outside the framework of the rule of
law. Are all political trials, by their very nature, outside the rule of law?
Is what we call constitutionalism contrary to the idea of a political trial?
The rule of law-more broadly constitutionalism-means limited
government. Its principles are that no one speaking with the authority
of government has arbitrary power over a citizen or any person in society, that all persons stand as equals before the law and share equal responsibility to it, and that judicial remedies from independent courts
21
can secure the rights of individuals against encroachment by the state.
19 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 90 (R. Warner trans. 1954).
20 G. KATKOV, THE TRIAL OF BUKHARIN 192 (1969).

For a transcript of the trial see

THE GREAT PURGE TRIAL (R. Tucker & S. Cohen eds. 1965).
21 Se A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

202-03 (1959); J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 37-40
(1978); C. FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON (1974); C. MCILWAIN, CON-
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Political trials are not incompatible with the rule of law. An examination of the questions political trials raise reveals that political trials can
make a positive contribution to an open and democratic society.

III.

A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL TRIALS

Political and criminal trials differ in the questions that they raise.
Criminal trials with no political agenda naturally raise difficult questions of law. Matters of due process, from controversies over search and
seizure or the Miranda rights to whether the death penalty is a cruel and
unusual punishment, can hardly be dismissed as easy cases. However,
ordinary criminal cases do not involve the dual legal and political
agenda that political trials simultaneously address. More precisely, ordinary criminal trials within a constitutional framework operate from a
legal agenda with only a trace, if any, of the political agenda. Conversely, partisan trials proceed according to a fully political agenda with
only a facade of legality (although the legalism might be turgid). Political trials within the rule of law juggle both the legal and the political
agendas.
A further classification of political trials would categorize them as
four types according to the basic issues of politics brought into question
by the trial: (l)Trials of corruption. The nature of the public realm is
at issue and the underlying question is, What things are public and
what are private? (2) Trials of dissenters. Here the correctness of both
public policy and methods of dissent is at issue. The dissenter asks, Is
the policy immoral? The dissenter, in turn, is asked, Is the dissent appropriate? (3) Trials of nationalists. A more basic issue, the nature of
representation, is raised here, and the questions become, Is the government representing one people yet ruling another? Does this nationalist
group represent a distinct people? (4) Trials of regimes. The most fundamental issue of politics, the nature of legitimacy, is undertaken when
one side asks, Was the former government legitimate? The other side
responds by asking, Is this court legitimate?
We should note the progression from the issue of the relationship of

the public and private realms to judgments about policy and dissent, to
conflicts over representation, and finally to the critical matter of legitimacy. This escalation from a political trial of a rather common variety
to the rare breed puts the court, the law, and the political order in in-

creasing difficulty. Each type presents a Gordian knot tied successively
tighter. The chart on the following page illustrates these types.
STITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN

58 COLUM. L. REv. 143, 149-50 (1958).

(1947); Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State,
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TABLE 1
TYPES OF POLITICAL TRIALS
Trial S
OF

0

0

Political Trials within the Rule of Law

Partisan Trials

Issue: The Public Realm
Questions: What is public? What is
private?
Examples: Francis Bacon (1621)
Judge Otto Kerner (1973)
Abscam Congressmen
(1980)

Issue: Power and Expediency
Question:
Is this political revenge?

Issue: Correctness of Policy, Methods
of Dissent
Questions: Is the policy immoral?
Is the dissent appropriate?
Examples: Fritz Adler (1917)
Catonsville Nine (Berrigan
brothers, 1968)
Boston Five (Spock
& Coffin, 1968)
Karl Armstrong (1973)

Issue: Power and Expediency

Issue: Representation
Questions: Does the government
represent all? Does the
nationalist group
represent a distinct
people?
Examples: Guy Fawkes (1606)
Robert Emmet (1803)
Roger Casement (1916)
Wounded Knee (1974)

Issue: Power and Expediency
Question:
Is the trial designed to
further the domination
over an ethnic group?

Issue: Legitimacy
Questions: Was the former
government legitimate?
Is the court?
Examples: Pres. Andrew Johnson
(1868)
Nuremberg (1945)

Issue: Power and Expediency
Question:
Is this victor's justice?

Examples:

Question:
Examples:

Examples:

Examples:

Anne Boleyn (1536)
Marcus Garvey (1925)

Is the trial designed to
eliminate opposition?
Socrates (399 BC)
Thomas More (1532)
Roger Williams (1635)
Anne Hutchinson (1638)
French Revolutionary
Tribunal (1793-94)
Stalin Trials (1936-38)

Spanish Inquisition (1478)
Sacco & Vanzetti (1921)
Scottsboro (1931)
SASO/BPC (South Africa,
1976)

Charles I (1649)
Louis XVI (1792)
Iranian Tribunal (1980)
Gang of Four (1980)

Political trials which proceed within the rule of law have their corresponding partisan trials. Trials of corruption can become mere trials
of revenge. This is apparently what happened to Anne Boleyn and to
*Marcus Garvey. Trials of dissenters can become a convenient way to
eliminate the opposition, as the trials of Socrates, Thomas More, and
others who have questioned public policy illustrate. Trials of ethnic nationalists, from the Spanish Inquistion against the Jews to the "terrorist"
trials in South Africa today, can become a step in the establishment of
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domination or elimination. Finally, a trial of a regime has the capacity
for being purely partisan, victor's justice. The issue in all partisan trials
is the same, namely, expediency in the use of power.
Obviously, any attempt to arrive at a typology involves a procrustean effort to fit unique cases into a few pigeonholes. More than one
political question can be raised in a given trial. Dissenters are often
nationalists, and nationalists dissent. From John Lilburne and Peter
Zenger to Lech Walesa, challengers of entrenched power raise many
questions. How, for instance, should we categorize those in the Soviet
Union? Some dissent on religious grounds, others for classically liberal
reasons, and still others as nationalists. Yet the Soviet authorities treat
them all as cases of insanity. As the Director of the Institute of Forensic
Psychiatry, G. Morozov, put it, "Why bother with political trials when
we have psychiatric clinics?"' 22 Nevertheless, in order to understand the
nature of political trials, we must classify and arrange them in some
logical order. Grouping them according to the issues they generate in
the political sphere recognizes that, acknowledged or not, the political
agenda is inescapably present in many trials.
A.

TRIALS OF CORRUPTION

If there ever was a classic trial for corruption, it would be the trial
of Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon in 1621. Bacon, one of the founders
of modern science, had published his critique of Aristotle, the Novum Organum, the previous year. His influential Adancement of Learning had
been published nearly two decades earlier. As a politician he had
served in Parliament for nineteen years and, with the accession of James
I, became the solicitor general, then the attorney general, a member of
22 Z. MEDVEDEV & R. MEDVEDEV, A QUESTION OF MADNESS 67 (1971). Richard Moran demonstrates that Daniel McNaughton did not meet the test which carries his name. It
seems that he was not insane, and, what is more, he attempted to assassinate Prime Minister
Peel for political reasons. The insanity verdict, Moran concludes, was employed to discredit
his political act. R. MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF
DANIEL McNAUGHTON (1981). As for attempts to classify political trials, it might be noted

here that Kirchheimer employs the following categories of political trials: (a) a common
crime committed for political purposes, (b) a regime's attempt to incriminate a foe, (c) use of
defamation, perjury, or contempt to discredit a foe. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 1,ch. III.
Becker classifies political trials by using quotation marks to designate which part of the proceeding is phony: (1) political trials, where the crime is political and the court impartial,
(2) political "trials," where the court is questionable, (3) "political" trials, where the charge is
a subterfuge but the court is fair, and (4) "political trials," where the charges are fabrications
and the proceeding is also fabricated. T. BECKER, supra note 1, Introduction. Nathan
Hakman finds the following types: (1) agents of foreign governments, (2) frame-ups,
(3) resistance and civil disobedience, and (4) "constructive" political trials where the defendant has no connection with a movement for or against change. HAKMAN, supra note 1. Friedman suggests three types: (1) politically motivated, (2) politically determined, and
(3) ordinary trials with political consequences. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 158.
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the Privy Council, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, and finally the powerful right hand of the king, Lord Chancellor. His affluence grew with
his power, but so did his enemies. His impeachment by Parliament for
taking bribes must be viewed as an attack also on King James. James,
who was not above taking bribes himself, acknowledged that "if I were
• . .to punish those who take bribes, I should soon not have a single
' 23
subject left."
On the advice of James, Bacon confessed to twenty-three counts of
corruption, admitting that he took gifts from litigants but denying that
he had been influenced. The House of Lords condemned him to pay a
ruinous fine of £40,000, to be imprisoned in the Tower during the
King's pleasure, and to be forever barred from holding office. Granting
full pardon, James released Bacon fron the Tower after four days and
remitted the fine. Although his scholarly career continued, Bacon's
political career was at an end. Before he died, he wrote in his notebook
about his trial: "I was the justest judge that was in England these fifty
years. But it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these 200
24
years."
History reveals no lack of trials for misuse of public authority for
private ends. Every generation has its Abscam, Watergate, or Teapot
Dome cases, and many similar cases involving lesser officials, calling our
attention to the temptations of power. The dilemmas inherent in holding public office arise not only from the influence that those with power
have for shaping policy toward special interests while claiming that they
are acting in the public interest, but also from their vulnerability to the
bad publicity of false charges.
For example, in 1971, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally
urged President Nixon, as a taped conversation reveals, to "satisfy dairymen" in order to secure their financial support in the 1972 election. In
1975, Connally was tried for accepting $10,000 in illegal gratuities from
the Associated Milk Producers in return for his efforts to obtain an increase in the milk price support. The major prosecution witness was a
lawyer from the Milk Producers, Jake Jacobsen, who had been granted
immunity from prosecution by the federal authorities in return for his
testimony. Connally was acquitted, but Jacobsen was arrested by the
Texas authorities for misuse of $825,000 in a savings and loan firm for
which he was an officer. 25 Was Connally the victim of a "con job" by
Jacobsen, or did Connally merely "beat the rap?"
When public officials are tried on charges of corruption, public con23 C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 428 (1956).
24 Id. at 209; see also F. ANDERSON, FRANCIs BACON (1962).

25 N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 2; Id, Apr. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2; Id, Apr. 18, 1975,
at 1,col. 1; Id, Aug. 7, 1975, at 61, col. 4.
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fidence in the judicial system is often at stake. Judge John Sirica became
7ime magazine's Man of the Year for upholding the integrity of the law
in the Watergate cases. Conversely, federal Court of Appeals Judge and
former Illinois Governor Otto Kerner was convicted of taking a bribe of
racetrack stock in return for favors to racetrack owners while he was
governor. Although he had an unimpaired reputation and insisted that
he was innocent, it was important to demonstrate to the public, as a New
York Times editorial pointed out, that not even so powerful an official as
Kerner is beyond the reach of the judicial system, especially when the
system is often accused of being stacked in favor of the elite and against
the lowly. 26 The prosecutor, incidentally, was James R. Thompson,
who later became the Illinois Governor partially because of his reputation for being tough on crime, gained somewhat in the Kerner case.
A trial of corruption can easily become partisan. Anne Boleyn's
trial for adultery and incest in 1536 is an example. Although Anne had
borne a female child to Henry VIII, she incurred Henry's sharp displeasure when a baby boy was born dead.. Henry's eye was also attracted
toward a maid of Anne's, Jane Seymour. He accused Anne of adultery,
and he referred the matter to the Privy Council. Faithfully, the members of the Council reported that Queen Anne had committed adultery
with five members of the court, including her own brother. The five,
plus Anne, were sent to the Tower, tried in Westminster, found guilty,
sentenced to death, and executed. Before the month was out Henry
married Jane. 27 Like all partisan trials, Anne Boleyn's lacks significant

political or legal questions. Just as the Privy Council and the court at
Westminster had obliged Henry, the Archbishop obliged Henry by annulling his marriage to her and declaring Elizabeth a bastard. Henry
wanted Anne out of his way, and the only question was how it could be
accomplished.
In summary, trials for corruption which operate within the rule of
law often present difficult entanglements of facts, legal issues, and ethical judgments. From the trial of Francis Bacon to the Watergate and
Abscam trials, a mesh of problems ensnare the courts and the public.
Who did what? Which witness can be believed? Was there criminal
intent? Were the defendants entrapped? These and many more questions arise in each case. Unlike a partisan trial, in which such potential
embarassments are sidestepped, these matters arise because of the rule of
law. Nevertheless, such trials are closer to ordinary criminal trials than
to other political trials. They might have far-reaching political consequences, often knocking powerful figures out of the arena. Their consid26 N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1973, at 42.
27 2 J. FROUDE, THE REIGN OF HENRY THE EIGHTH 146 (1909).
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erable effect on historical events notwithstanding, such trials are largely
criminal trials of important political figures.
B.

TRIALS OF DISSENTERS

When dissenters are tried, so are the policies of the government. In
the trial of the Berrigan brothers and the others in the Catonsville Nine
case who were charged with destroying government property when they
raided the Selective Service offices and burned the draft records, the
prosecutor emphasized that the war in Vietnam was not an issue of the
trial:
I want it clearly understood that the government is not about to put itself
in the position-has not heretofore and is not now-of conducting its policies at the end of a string tied to the consciences of these nine defendants.
This trial does not include the issues of the Vietnam conflict. It does not
include the issue of whether the United States ought to be in the conflict or
out of it.
But this prosecution is the government's response, the law's response,
the people's response, to what the defendants did. And what they did was
to take government property and throw flammable material upon it and
burn it beyond recognition. And that is what this case is about. 28
The defense, on the other hand, saw the Vietnam war as the only
important issue in the trial. As William Kunstler told the jury:
The trial of Socrates was not merely a question of a man sowing confusion
and distrust among the youth in Athens; the trial of Jesus could not be
reduced to one of conspiracy against the Empire.
In the first place, we agree with the prosecutor as to the essential facts
of the case. The defendants did participate in the burning of records.
It is not a question of records which are independent of life. We are
not talking about driving licenses or licenses to operate a brewery. We are
speaking of one kind of record. No others so directly affect life and death
on a mass scale, as do these. They affect every mother's son who is registered with any Board. These records stand quite literally for life and death
to young men.
They wanted, in some small way, to throw a roadblock into a system
which they considered murderous, which was grinding young men, many
thousands of them, to death in Vietnam.
Also, they wanted, as they said, to reach the American public, to
28 D. BERRIGAN, THE TRIAL OF THE CATONSVILLE NINE 100 (1970). Stephen Schafer
makes the important distinction between the conventional criminal who "acts to fulfill his ego
or personal interest" and the convictional criminal who aims at moral or social change, "a
David striking at a Goliath of injustice."

S. SCHAFER, THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL; THE

PROBLEM OF MORALITY AND CRIME 146-47 (1974).

RONALD CHRISTENSON

[Vol. 74

reach you. They were trying to make an outcry, an anguished outcry, to
reach the American community before it was too late. It was a cry that
could conceivably have been made in Germany in 1931 and 1932, if there
were someone to listen and act on it. It was a cry of despair and anguish
and hope, all at the same time.
And to make this outcry, they were willing
29
to risk years of their lives.
If the political issues cannot be introduced as part of the testimony,
they can make their entry through various legal portals. In 1916, for
example, Friedrich Adler, a brilliant physicist who was also a leader of
the Austrian Social Democrats and associate of the key European socialists, shot and killed Prime Minister Count Sturgkh. For Adler, the central issue of his trial was not his guilt or innocence, but whether his act
had been justified. Although not allowed to introduce his position as
evidence, Adler succeeded in putting it forth whenever he had the opportunity. When asked by the judge, "Herr Doctor Friedrich Adler,
please step forward. Do you plead guilty?" Adler startled the audience
and the court by replying, "I am guilty to the same degree as eveg oJterwho
''3
has killed in a war or who has given the order to kill-no less and no more! 0
Adler distanced himself from his counsel, who would explain the
assassination by saying he was insane: "The defense counsel, from the
responsibilities of his office, has the duty of seeking to save my life. I
have the duty of standing up for my beliefs, which are more important
to me than whether during this war in Austria one more man will be
hanged or not." Adler was tried before an especially moderate and untraditional judge who permitted him, when asked to present his version
of the facts in the case, to analyze the indictment. The indictment
stated that "the reprehensibility of murder as a political means cannot
be a subject for debate among moral men in an orderly society." Adler
attacked the assumption that Austria at war was an orderly society and
cataloged the illegal acts of the government. Throughout the trial Adler
reversed the government case, constructing an indictment against the
Austrian government, not for the court but for the public.
Although he frequently spoke his mind during the trial, working in
his justification at every point, in his closing remarks Adler reasserted his
indictment. Adler responded to the prosecutor's claim that vanity motivated the assassination by stating:
The real reason I want to speak is that I must explain that the question of murder, for me, has always been a real moral question. .

.

. I have

always believed that the violent killing of men was inhuman, and that it is
because we live in an Age of Barbarism that we are reduced to killing men.
29 D. BERRIGAN, ..zra note 28, at 103-04.
30 R. FLORENCE, FRrrz: THE STORY OF A POLrrICAL ASSASSIN 221 (1971) (emphasis in

original).
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I completely agree with my colleagues who argue: War isinhuman. And I
will not deny: Revolution is also inhuman.

[W]hen one comes to the historical realization that man cannot and
should not be a true Christ in the Age of Barbarism, in the Age of Inhumanity, in the Age of Unkultur, in which we live, then there is only the
alternative standpoint: If we must really kill and be killed, then murder
cannot be apri'vilegeof the rulers, we must also be ready to resort to force. If it

is true that the Age of Humanity has still not come, then we should at least
employ force only in the service of the idea of humanity.
I have heard the war justified, and I have understood the arguments
which justified the war.
As they marched through Belgium and an innocent people fell as victims, as women and children were killed, they said: Necessity knows no
commandments, it is war, there was no alternative.
As the Lusitania sank, and a mass of innocent civilians met their
deaths, again they said: It is war, there was no alternative ...
We live in a time when battlefields are covered with hundreds of
thousands of dead, when tens of thousands of men lie beneath the sea. It is
war, it is necessity, they say to justify it.
But if one man should fall, a man who has destroyed the constitution
of Austria, who has trampled the laws of Austria into the ground, if the
one man who is most guilty for these horrors should fall, then suddenly
they confront me and say: Human life is sacred.31
Adler concluded by saying that he knew what the verdict would be,
but, quoting poetry, "Not all are dead who are entombed,/ For you
cannot kill the spirit, ye brethren!"3 2 Adler was found guilty and sentenced to death. As he was escorted from the courtroom, he turned to
the galleries and the windows and shouted, "Long live the International
Revolutionary Social Democracy!" Since Austria lost the war, Adler
was not executed, but he had his sentence commuted to eighteen years
imprisonment, and finally he was granted the amnesty extended to all
political prisoners. By 1921 he was the organizer of a new international,
the Social Workers International, and he lived to be eighty-one years
33

old.

In another trial of a war dissenter, the issue for the prosecution was
again the method of dissent, while the issue for the defense was the war
itself.3 4 Karl Armstrong bombed the Army Math Research Center at

the University of Wisconsin in 1970, unintentionally killing a physics
31 Id. at 263-65 (emphasis in original).
32

Id. at 266.

33

Id. at 263-65, 267, 276, 302, 317.

34 Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 7-9, Wisconsin v. Armstrong (No. 7-258) (Cir. Ct.

Dane County Oct. 15, 1973).
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student and injuring five other persons. His sentencing hearing became
a trial of the war in Vietnam.
The defense endeavored to demonstrate the illegality of the war
itself, to show that it was conducted illegally with weapons forbidden by
the Geneva Convention, and to establish that the Army Math Research
Center translated theoretical knowledge into instruments of war
designed to kill. As William Kunstler, Armstrong's attorney, expressed
the defense aim:
[F]or the general public this will be a unique educational experience. Because out of the absolute chaos and tragedy of the last dozen years we hope
to provide a clue to the motivation of a young man brought up in this
but a continuation of a tragMadison community who saw nothing ahead
35
edy that passes all human understanding.
Kunstler led an array of thirty-eight Vietnam veterans, anti-war activists, and experts on the war through nine days of testimony to evince
that Armstrong's bombing, which mistakenly took one life, must be
weighed against the government's war which was deliberately killing
thousands.
The prosecution, in brief cross-examinations, established that most
defense witnesses had never met Karl Armstrong before coming to
Madison to testify in his behalf. Michael Zaleski, Assistant Attorney
General, portrayed Armstrong as "an egotistical loser" who had a desire
for recognition when he built the bomb, and remained unrepentant after he killed one person, injured others, and destroyed both property
and research. Zaleski saw no morality in the bombing, only the "anarchical law of the lynch mob, taking the law into our own hands. ' 36
Both Adler and Armstrong turned to violence after becoming frustrated with democratic methods. Adler had watched his father, Victor
Adler, spend years leading the Austrian Social Democrats against war.
In 1914 the senior Adler, then a member of the Austrian parliament,
began to support and justify the war. Listening to his father rationalizing the abandonment of his "war against war" rhetoric, Friedrich felt
as if his "whole life plans and life work had been wrecked. ' 37 Hence,
Friedrich resolved to oppose the war as an individual and began planning the assassination of the Prime Minister.
Armstrong had participated in various demonstrations against the
Vietnam war, but his experiences at the 1968 Democratic Convention in
Chicago convinced him that nonviolent demonstrations would not stop
the war. The trials of Adler and Armstrong confronted society with dissenters who maintained that a selective act of violence was morally right
35

Id.

36 Id. at 11 (Nov. 1, 1973).
37

R. FLORENCE, supra note 30, at 133.

1983]

POLITICAL TRIALS

in order to halt war's wholesale killing. The state, on the other hand,
naturally drew the public's attention to the violent act and the consequences for society if those who commit them receive a light
punishment.
Violence wipes away the persuasive argument of conscience. It is
difficult to convince a judge, jury, or the public that an act of dissent
was morally justified when someone is killed, whether that someone is
directly involved like the Austrian Prime Minister, or an innocent bystander like Robert Fassnacht, Armstrong's victim. The position of conscience is powerful when, as in the case of Thomas More or the Berrigan
brothers, the acts are symbolic. When faced with a charge of treason for
refusing to give assent to royal supremacy over the Church, More submitted that silence itself is no crime, and that treason is an overt act. He
further maintained that even if silence were construed as an act, the
presumption must be that it means consent rather than the reverse, that
a loyal subject by definition cannot harbor seditious thoughts, and that
such a subject when in doubt will refer to his conscience. 38
The issue in More's trial became the question of the obligation of
conscience. According to G.R. Elton, conscience for More meant "a recognition of. .. the truth established by a greater consensus than was
available in one realm alone."' 39 More made it clear that by conscience
he did not mean everyone's right to judge arbitrarily but, instead, the
duty to accept a vision granted to the body of Christians. "And therefore," he said, "I am not bound to conform by conscience to the council
of one realm against the general council of Christendom." Archbishop
Thomas Cromwell, More's prosecutor, argued for "the conscience of the
subject, the member of the community of England who owed a duty to
obey the law made for that community by the King-in-Parliament," a
duty which Cromwell did not see as conflicting with divine law because
the pope's authority rested on no scriptural authority. 4° Both More and
Cromwell accepted the idea that conscience is a joint knowledge between an individual and the community. Both rejected the notion that
conscience is an individual assertion of judgment. Where they differed
was in the source of the community's knowledge: Does conscience derive from all Christendom or from a national realm?
When William Kunstler quoted Peter Zenger's attorney's exhortation that the jury "make use of their conscience" to the Catonsville jury,
Judge Roszel Thomsen admonished Kunstler:
You are urging the jury to make their decision on the basis of conscience.
38 Derrett, The Trial of Sir Thomas More, 312 ENG. HIsT. REv. 459 (1964).
39 G. ELTON, sufpra note 5, at 417.
40 Id.
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This morning, I said to you that if you attempt to argue that the jury has
the power to decide this case on the basis of conscience, the court will
interrupt to tell the jury their duty. The jury may not decide this case on
the basis of conscience of the defendants. They
are to decide this case only
41
on the basis of facts presented by both sides.
Daniel Berrigan asked the judge to consider whether or not his reverence for the law did not require him:
to interpret and adjust the law to the needs of people here and now. I
believe no tradition can remain a mere dead inheritance. It is a living
inheritance which we must continue to offer to the living. So it may be
possible, even though the law excludes certain important questions of conthereby, to bring the tradiscience, to include them none the less [sic]; and
42
tion of life again for the sake of the people.
Judge Thomsen responded during a colloquy outside the hearing of the
jury that as a man he was moved by what the defendants said, but as a
judge he must say that the "basic principle of our law is that we do
things in an orderly fashion. People cannot take the law into their own
43
hands."
Questions about the relationship between conscience and law can
arise in trials of dissenters when the trials are conducted within the
framework of the rule of law and, even in rare instances such as More's
trial, in partisan trials. Judge Thomsen commented to the defendants
that:
[I]f you had done this thing in many countries of the world, you would not
be standing here. You would have been in your coffins long ago. Now,
nobody is going to draw and quarter you. You may be convicted by the
jury, and if you are,44I certainly propose to give you every opportunity to
say what you want.
At many political trials the "getting-to-say-what-you-want"

is the whole

point.
C.

TRIALS OF NATIONALISTS

In trials of ethnic nationalists the nature of representation is at
stake. Does the government represent all the people, or does it represent
one people yet rule another? Who speaks for the American Indians: the
United States government, tribal councils, or the American Indian
Movement? Do the Unionist members of Parliament from Northern
Ireland speak for the Catholic population, does Parliament, or does the
Irish Republican Army? This controversy is comparatively more challenging to the rule of law than is the issue raised in trials of dissenters.
41

D.

BERRIGAN,

42 Id. at 114-15.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 114.

stra note 28, at 105.
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Dissenters will condemn immoral policies of the government, and their
prosecutors will denounce their methods of dissent. Both are important
political issues. Nevertheless, both parties in such trials come to the
court willing to use the trial as a vehicle for touching the sense of rightness held by the public. Adler, Armstrong, and the Berrigans, for instance, could approach the trial with the attitude that within the rule of
law the trial enables them to address the immorality of war, making an
appeal for the people to wake up and prompt a change in policy. The
government, on the other hand, could approach such a trial with the
expectation that it would discredit the dissenters in the eyes of the public. Trials of ethnic nationalists, by contrast, up the ante by raising
more difficult questions: Who are the people and who can speak for
them? Is there a distinct people within the public that the government
does not represent but that a nationalist group does? Can the judge and
jury in such cases operate within the rule of law?
Because of these questions, trials of nationalists are more likely to
become partisan than trials for corruption or dissent. In trials of corruption or dissent both sides can say, for example, "We are all Americans in
one legal and political tradition which is now violated and is in danger
of being undermined by the other side." The judge, the jury, and finally
the public can be aroused to return us to the rightful tradition. But this
one tradition and its common public are the very matters questioned in
trials of nationalists. Consequently, the opportunities and dangers of
fabricating a partisan trial are ample.
South Africa, with its apartheid and draconian terrorism laws, provides clear examples of partisan trials of nationalists. The many
apartheid laws ensure that separate communities develop and that the
whites dominate the Africans, while the security laws interpret all opposition by the Africans, even speeches, as terroristic activity. 45 In 1974,
following the independence of Mozambique which was led by the Frelimo movement, the leaders of two black organizations, the South African Students' Organization (SASO) and the Black People's Convention
(BPC), were arrested and later brought to trial for the "Viva Frelimo"
rallies they held in celebration. The speeches, publication, poetry, and
theater, were, according to the prosecution, intended to promote hostility between whites and blacks and to endanger the law and order of the
society.

Although not among the accused, Steve Biko (who was already
under banning orders, otherwise he surely would also have been indicted) was called as a defense witness. As a founder of SASO and head

of BPC, Biko was a key witness who was questioned by one of the lead45

J.

DUGARD, supra note

21, at 53, 262.
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ing South African defense lawyers, David Soggott. In five days of testimony Biko was able to explain the intentions and meaning of the two
black organizations. When asked by Soggott what the concept of Black
Consciousness means, Biko replied:
[I] think the Black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He is
first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through
heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult living
conditions, through poor education-these are all external to him-and
secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the Black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation. He rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning White to all that is good;
in other
46
words, he associates good-and he equates good-with White.
The nine SASO/BPC leaders were convicted of terroristic conspiracy and sentenced to five- and six-year imprisonments. Although Judge
Boshoff found that neither SASO nor BPC had conspired to bring about
revolutionary change by violent means, he thought that they were part
of the larger conspiracy "to achieve total liberation of the black people
and to bring about a total change of the political, social and economic
system of the Republic." Their means of liberation were, according to
the judge, designed to further the hostility between whites and blacks to
such an extent that he was "satisfied on all the evidence that SASO and
BPC were protest groups, politically, and that the common method or
means employed by them was in the prevailing circumstances capable
of endangering the maintenance of law and order, and constituted par'47
ticipation in terroristic activities.
In his 1962 trial for inciting African workers to strike, Nelson
Mandela, a lawyer and leader of the African National Congress (ANC)
who is still imprisoned following a 1964 trial, expressed the feelings any
nationalist would have in a partisan trial:
I want to apply for Your Worship's recusal from this case. I challenge
the right of this court to try me. First, I challenge it because I fear that I
will not be given a fair and proper trial. Secondly, I consider myself
neither legally nor morally bound to obey laws made by a Parliament in
which I have no representation. What sort ofjustice enables the aggrieved
to sit in judgment over those against whom they have laid a charge?
The white man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and
accuses us, and he sits in judgment over us. In this courtroom I face a
white magistrate, I am confronted by a white prosecutor, and I am escorted into the dock by a white orderly. The atmosphere of white domination lurks all around in the courtroom. It reminds me that I am voteless
because there is a Parliament in this country that is white-controlled. I am
46 S. BIKO, BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 22 (1979). See also D. WOODS,
BIKO ch. 3 (1978).
47 J. DUGARD, supra note 21, at 226.
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without land because the white minority has taken a lion's share of my
country and forced my people to occupy poverty-stricken reserves,
overpopulated and overstocked, in which we are ravaged by starvation
and disease. These courts are not impartial tribunals dispensing justice but
instruments used by the white man to punish those among us who clamor
for deliverance from white rule ...
Any thinking African in this country4 8is driven continuously to a conflict between his conscience and the law.
The trial of Dennis Banks and Russell Means for the take-over at
Wounded Knee provides an instance of a trial of nationalists which was
conducted within the rule of law. Those associated with the American
Indian Movement (AIM) felt that the federal government had failed to
fulfill its commitments under the 1868 Treaty, the local white people
and governments were openly hostile, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) was unresponsive, and the tribal council was dominated by a corrupt chairman and his "goon squad." AIM was invited to the Pine
Ridge Reservation in order to promote change. Banks and Means were
charged with burglary of the Wounded Knee Trading Post, assault
against FBI agents, obstructing federal officials by building roadblocks,
unlawful possession of firearms, and with conspiring with others to do
all of these things and even more, such as seizing the homes and trailers
of the Wounded Knee residents and the Sacred Heart Catholic Church.
For the prosecution, these acts, and not violations of the 1868
Treaty or treatment of Indians by the government, were the issue at
trial. Assistant U.S. Attorney R.D. Hurd told the jury:
I don't care and it doesn't make any difference if conditions on the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation are good or bad. Conditions everywhere should
be improved. . . . I don't care if the 1868 Treaty was violated or was not
violated by the United States. In our society we have methods and means
of redress. Primarily there are two. There is the courts, and there is the
ballot box. . . . If people in their vigor can inflict violence on innocent
commit crimes, then a system of democracy cannot exist. It's
people, can
49
anarchy.
The government's presumption was that the U.S. government, the BIA,
and the elected tribal council all represent the Oglala Sioux. Hurd
stressed to the jury that the government case was not against Indians,
for, after all, many of their witnesses were Indians. The case, he insisted,
was against Banks and Means who, with AIM, brought terror to the
Indians and others in Wounded Knee.
By calling witnesses such as Vine Deloria and Dee Brown, both
well-known authors on Indian politics and history, the defense introD. WOODS, supra note 46, at 22.
49 Transcript of Trial Proceedings 21,128-33, 21,190, United States v. Dennis Banks and
Russell Means (Nos. CR 73-5034, 5035, 5062, 5063) (W.D.S.D. Sept. 10, 1974).
48
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duced the jury to the 1868 Treaty and to historical justification for violence, such as the American Revolution. The treaty had guaranteed all
of what is now South Dakota west of the Missouri River, including the
Black Hills, to the Sioux. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act enrolled
nonmembers into the tribe, according to Gladys Bissonette, a Sioux witness, depriving "the grass roots people of our reservation" and giving
control to the "new people," now represented by the tribal council.
When presented under cross-examination with the words of Banks suggesting that AIM would win the war at Wounded Knee, and that this
war was only a beginning, she replied, "I would say that this was not the
beginning of a war between the United States government and the Indians. We've been at war with the government all our lives."' 50
Trials of Irish nationalists often feature what is known as the "Irish
speech from the dock." When twenty-four-year-old Robert Emmet
traveled to Europe in 1802 seeking support for an expected uprising in
Ireland, he met Napoleon and Talleyrand but returned to Dublin with
nothing more than promises from France to help if the rebellion were
successful. Although Emmet and a few hundred supporters, dressed in
green, began the rebellion and killed the lord chief justice and several
others, the Emmet forces were soon in disarray. During his trial for treason, and after he had been judged guilty, the judge asked him why he
should not be sentenced to death. "Why the sentence of the law should
not be passed upon me," he replied, "I have nothing to say. Why the
sentence which in the public mind is usually attached to that of the law,
ought to be reversed, I have much to say." He then launched into an
eloquent refutation of the charge that he conspired to join Ireland to
France. His cause was "not for France, but for liberty." He admitted
communication with France, but:
God forbid that I should see my country under the hands of a foreign
power ....
If the French came as a foreign power, Oh, my countrymen!
meet them on the shore with a torch in one hand-a sword in the otherreceive them with all the destruction of war-immolate them in their boats
before our native soil shall be polluted by a foreign foe.
When he proclaimed that his true cause was not France but Ireland, "to
effect a separation from England," the judge interrupted Emmet to remind him that he was called upon to tell the court why the death sentence should not be pronounced, but instead "you are making an
avowal of dreadful treasons." The judge admonished Emmet: "You
50 Id. at 19,218-31 (Aug. 16, 1974). In 1980, the Sioux "won" a United States Supreme
Court case based on the 1868 Treaty and were awarded $106 million. See United States v.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). Because they wanted the land, not the money, AIM,
under the leadership of Bill Means, Russell's brother, occupied an 800-acre campsite in the
Black Hills. Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 23, 1981, at 9A.
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should make some better atonement to expiate your own crimes and
alleviate the misfortunes you have brought upon your country. .. "
Emmet answered that his motive resulted from "an ardent attachment
to my country, from a sense of public duty," but if he were not permitted to vindicate his cause and character, he would go to his cold grave in
51
charitable silence and rest there without an epitaph.
Likewise, in 1916 when Roger Casement was tried in Old Bailey for
going to Germany and returning to Ireland in a German submarine in
time for the Easter uprising, he ordered his counsel not to attempt to
clear him but, rather, "to defend and make clear an extreme Irish Nationalist's standpoint-that I wanted to put up a straight fight for Ireland," that he was not an English traitor, not a dreamer, and not a fool,
but an Irish patriot. Casement told the jury that "the rebellion was not
made in Germany, and that not one penny of German gold went to
finance it." He said he had never sold himself to any government, but
he always claimed that an Irishman "has no right to fight for any land
but Ireland. .

.

. From the first moment I landed on the Continent

until I came home again to Ireland I never asked for nor accepted a
single penny of foreign money.

.

.

for only the money of Irishmen.

'52

He, like Emmet, was executed as a traitor.
D.

TRIALS OF REGIMES

Trials of nationalists are challenging because the court must inevitably assume that it represents those for whom the accused presumes to
speak, that, AIM and Irish nationalist organizations notwithstanding,
the law covers all, including Indians under United States governance
and the Irish under British governance. An English charge of treason
against an Irish nationalist is difficult enough to try, but when the regimes themselves are tried, the law can hardly encompass the task.
Under what law can those who make law be tried? The principle of the
rule of law providing that no one is above the law should, strictly from
the perspective of the law alone, be enough. When regimes are tried,
however, the full force of symbolism and the total weight of the political
consequences of putting the head of state on trial are as much present in
the courtroom as the principles of law. The basic issue which gives such
trials their unique gravity is legitimacy. By what authority can a regime
be tried? Is a regime beyond good and evil and responsibility to the
law? Is a court?
When Cromwell persuaded the Rump Parliament to establish a
court to try Charles I, he answered the question of authority:
51 28 STATE TRIALS, sufira note 8, at 1172-77.

52 B. REID, THE LivEs OF ROGER CASEMENT 399-400 (1976).
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'If any man hath carried on the design of deposing the King and disinheriting his posterity . . . he should be the greatest rebel and traitor in

the world, but,'. . . 'since the Providence of God hath cast this upon us, I
cannot but submit
to Providence, though I am not yet provided to give
53
you advice.'
When Charles appeared before the High Court in Westminster Hall,
however, he refused to answer the charge of treason ("levy war against
parliament and kingdom") until he was told by what lawful authority
he was summoned:
When I know what lawful authority, I shall answer. Remember I am
your king, your lawful king, and what sins you bring upon your heads, and
the judgment of God upon this land; think well upon it, I say, think well
upon it, before you go further from one sin to a greater. .

.

. I shall not

betray my trust; I have a trust committed to me by God, by old and lawful
54
descent; I will not betray it, to answer to a new unlawful authority.
Thus, the duty to try the king because of Providence's command is met
in court by the refusal to answer the charges because of divine right of
kings: a legal impasse, but not a political stand-off.
Charles persistently refused to answer the charge of treason, but
"required" that his reasons be heard. Lord President Bradshaw informed him that "it is not for Prisoners to require." "Prisoners!" responded Charles, "Sir, I am not an ordinary prisoner." Charles
continued to challenge the authority of the High Court of Parliament to
charge and try the king, although he was "no skeptic for to deny the
Power that you have; I know that you have Power enough." To
Charles' insistence that "the Commons of England was never a Court of
Judicature" and that he as king could not be delinquent under the law,
Bradshaw answered with a lengthy exposition. He told Charles that "as
the Law is your Superior, so truly, Sir, there is something that is superior
to the Law, and that is indeed the Parent or Author of the Law, and
that is the people of England." The end of all governments, kings or
any other kind, is the enjoyment of justice, and all who govern are officers in that trust. Parliaments were ordained to redress the grievances
of the people, but Charles had intended:
[T]o subvert the Fundamental Laws of the Land: for the great bulwark of
the Liberties of the People is the Parliament of England; and to subvert
and root up that, which your aim hath been to do, certainly at one blow
you had confounded the Liberties and the Property of England.
In an ominous image Bradshaw told Charles, "Sir, we must deal plainly
with you," and compared him to Emperor Caligula who had said he
wished the people of Rome had but one neck so that in one blow he
might cut it off:
E. WINGFIELD-STRATFORD, KING CHARLES
54 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 8, at 990-96.
53

THE MARTYR:

1643-1649, at 312 (1950).

1983]

POLITICAL TRIALS

And your proceedings have been somewhat like to this: for the body of the
people of England hath been (and where else) represented but in the Parliament; and could you but have confounded that, you had at one blow
cut off the neck of England. But God hath reserved better things for us,
and hath pleased for to confound your designs, and to break your forces,
and to5bring
your person into custody, that you might be responsible to
5
justice.
Three days later Charles was beheaded.
When Louis XVI was tried by the National Convention during the
Jacobin supremacy, no one pleaded the king's case. One deputy,
Charles Morisson, came close when he argued that the revolutionary
Constitution of 1781 recognized the ancient inviolability of kings. His
main argument, however, was that given the consequences for England
when Charles was executed, it would be in France's interests to banish
56
Louis.
The twenty-five-year-old firebrand, Saint-Just, argued that the laws
and courts are intended for citizens, not kings. Louis, Saint-Just maintained, must either reign or die, but he could not be judged. Louis was a
rebel, an alien, a prisoner of war who waged war against the people and
was conquered. Only the law of nations, not the law for citizens, could
apply to Louis. "No man can reign innocently. The folly is all too evident. Every king is a rebel and an usurper. '57 Louis, in other words,
was guilty of being king.
Robespierre, Saint-Just's fellow Jacobin, continued this line of
thought by denying that the proceeding against Louis was a trial, that
Louis was accused, or that the National Convention members were
judges:
You are, and you can only be, statesmen and representatives of the nation.
You do not have a verdict to give for or against a man, but a measure to
take for the public safety, a precautionary act to execute for the nation. A
deposed king in a Republic is good only for two things: either to trouble
the tranquillity
of the state and to undermine liberty, or to strengthen
58
both.
The victory of the revolution, in Robespierre's reasoning, was the
verdict against Louis. He could not be judged because he had been
condemned already. To put Louis on trial would be "counter-revolutionary since it would bring the revolution itself before the court." If
Louis were to be tried, he might be found innocent and would be presumed innocent until the verdict. "If Louis is acquitted, where then is
55

Id. at 1000-11.

56 REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 110-20. See also D. JORDAN, THE KING'S
TRIAL (1979).
57 REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 121-26.
58 Id. at 131.
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the revolution? If Louis is innocent, all defenders of liberty are
59
slanderers."
Saint-Just and Robespierre present us with the most transparent
case for the logic of power upon which the justification for modern totalitarianism has been built. 6° Contrary to the Jacobin thinking, however,
a trial of a regime need not be outside of law. The impeachment trial of
President Andrew Johnson appears to be within the standards of the
rule of law, 6 1 and there seems to be every reason to expect, had President Nixon been tried upon his impeachment, that he would have received a fair trial by the Senate.
The most important political trial of our century was the Nuremberg Trial. It raised the same questions other trials of regimes do: Was
the Nazi regime legitimate? Was the International Military Tribunal
legitimate? Except for Article Three of the Tribunal's Constitution,
which disallowed any challenges to the Tribunal's authority, the Nazi
leaders might have taken the position Charles I took. On the other side,
Justice Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor for the United States, began his opening address by justifying the Tribunal's authority:
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate
their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated. That
four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law 6is2 one of the most significant tributes that Power has
ever paid to Reason.
Jackson went on to acknowledge that the trial was unprecedented and
that, unfortunately, the nature of the crimes was such that "both prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes."
The accused were given a fair opportunity to defend themselves and,
despite a public opinion which condemned their acts, a presumption of
59 Id.
60 See A. CAMUS, THE REBEL ch. I1 (1956);
IAN DEMOCRACY
61 In a recent

J. TALMON,

THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITAR-

78-98 (1960).
study of the trial of President Johnson, Michael Les Benedict observes:

Historians should view the trial of impeachment for what it was: not as an attempt
by a violent majority to remove an innocent president for partisan purposes, but as one
of the great legal cases of history, in which American politicians demonstrated the
strength of the nation's democratic institutions by attempting to do what no one could
justifiably expect them to do-to give a political officer a full and fair trial in a time of
political crisis.
M. BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 143 (1973). On the
other hand, Raoul Berger concludes that Johnson's itnpeachment was an abuse of the impeachment process. "It was the culmination of a sustained effort to make him subservient to
Congress, to alter the place of a coordinate branch in the constitutional scheme." R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 308 (1973).
62 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 98-99 (1947).
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innocence. 63
Was the Nuremberg Trial within the rule of law? From a position
of positivist jurisprudence it decidedly was not within the rule of law.
No international code outlawed "crimes against humanity" and, therefore, the indictment was new law and the trial expostfacto. Likewise, the
Nazi leaders were charged with conspiracy, an Anglo-American legal
concept unknown in either European or international law. Two other
charges, on the other hand, could be understood as defined by the
Hague and Geneva Conventions (war crimes, "violations of the laws or
customs of war") and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (crimes against peace,
"planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of aggression"). Nevertheless, a positivist would not accept the notion that aggressive war was a
crime.
Other flaws in the Nuremberg Trial are also serious. Francis Biddle,
the Senior American Tribunal Member, sat as a judge, although he had
helped plan the trial. The Soviets blamed the Nazis for the Katyn massacre of Polish officers; the massacre was a Soviet act. As prosecutor,
Jackson asserted that the same law would be applied to all, but the Tribunal did not allow the defendants to cite Allied misdeeds, which were
considerable. The London Charter of June 1945 resembled a bill of attainder singling out individuals for prosecution. Finally, planning for
the trial was rushed, creating several blunders: the elderly Gustav
Krupp, who was not competent to stand trial, was indicted instead of his
son, Alfred. Julius Stricher was hanged, but Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, was used as a prosecution witness. Otto Dietrich, second to Goebbels in the propaganda hierarchy, was not
prosecuted, while Hans Fritzsche, a mere radio announcer, was
64
prosecuted.
Nevertheless, while admitting how deeply flawed the Nuremberg
Trial was, compelling reasons can lead us to say that, on balance, it was
within the rule of law. First, the Tribunal possessed judicial independence. Both the British and the American judges insisted on this principle, and the French judges exhibited their independence from the
French government. Only the presence of the Soviet members, taking a
hard line, serves to raise questions about the degree of their independence from Stalin's policy. As Bradley Smith shows, evidence indicates
that, given the interaction among the judges especially during deliberations, "all in all, it is reasonable to conclude that, although there were
different degrees of independence granted to the Tribunal members,
63 Id.

at 100-02.

64 B. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 9, 33, 43, 71, 81, 104, 203, 293
(1979).
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and although the individual judges made different use of their prerogatives, the defendants faced a court surprisingly free from outside
65
control."
Another important consideration in assessing the Nuremberg Trial
is to assess the main alternative. In the United States, President
Roosevelt faced the Morgenthau Plan which, among other suggestions,
contained a simple proposal: compile a list of the Nazi criminals for the
66
Allied military to identify and shoot as soon as they were captured.
The trial and the deliberations associated with it, Bradley Smith points
out, may have forestalled a bloodbath. By establishing what procedural
protections there were in the trial, the Nuremberg Tribunal also
avoided becoming merely aprofonna trial, a partisan trial as a wartime
67
precedent.
Finally, the Nuremberg Trial strengthened the rule of law at the
international legal level by enforcing what has come to be known as the
Nuremberg Principle: "[I]ndividuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under international
law. "8
IV.

CONCLUSION

A political trial falls between politics and law. In politics, justice
and the legal bounds of the rule of law are embarrassments to the realist.
In law, the legalist cannot acknowledge public influence and the political consequences of judgments by courts. The realist would have us
believe that, as the world goes, all trials are political, just as the legalist
would have it that, properly, none are political. Yet, it is evident that
trials can be political without being partisan. The Nuremberg trial cannot be equated with the trial of Louis XVI; the Wounded Knee trial
was different in kind from the SASO/BPC trial; what Karl Armstrong
or the Berrigan brothers experienced in their trials bears no resemblance
to the experiences of those tried by the Stalin regime.
If law and politics are thought of as two completely separate realms
in our public life, political trials would not cease to exist. We might,
however, deny that they exist by defining them away. The lofty pedestal of legalism encourages us to mistake the rules of law for the rule of
65 Id. at 8. See also id. at 77, 144, 168, 215, 267, 291, 303-04.
66 Id. at 23-24.
67 Id.

at 303.
68 T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 84 (1970) (quoting

the International Tribunal at Nuremberg).
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law. We see the rules so clearly that we miss the principles on which
they stand. An introduction of such issues as the rightness of policy or
the representativeness of government, from this perspective, is rejected
as contrary to the rules of law, as a "political defense." The problem
with this critique of political trials is that while a "political defense" is
castigated, a "political prosecution" might slip past us unnoticed. While
William Kunstler might be accused of introducing matters of social justice to sway a jury by appealing to their conscience, every prosecutor
who jumps from the narrow confines of an indictment to warn the jury
that the defendant is a harbinger of anarchy taking the law into his own
hands is doing for his side what Kunstler does for the defense. Clarence
Darrow won acquittals for many of his clients accused of conspiracy by
convincing the jury that a worse conspiracy was represented at the prosecution table by those who were using the "law for the purpose of bring'69
ing righteous ones to death or to jail."
Still, unless law and politics are separate, unless a respectful distance is maintained between them, law will become an instrument of
expediency. We have enough evidence in partisan trials to see this danger. If believing that law and politics can be totally separate is an illusion, thinking that law is politics by another means imperils those very
rights which in a free and democratic society are the purpose of politics.
An independent judiciary keeps constitutional politics honest by holding
it to the rule of law.
Political trials within the rule of law provide society with the occasion to examine, and perhaps redefine, itself. Such trials do not, perhaps
cannot, resolve the tensions forever. The Berrigans did not stop the
draft, nor did the federal government halt anti-Vietnam protests with
the Catonsville Nine trial. The issues about the immorality of the war
and the proper methods of dissent were not given a definitive answer.
They were clarified, however. The trial for the occupation of Wounded
Knee neither restored to the Sioux the Black Hills guaranteed by the
1868 Treaty nor reconciled AIM and its supporters to the BIA and the
tribal council. The issue of who speaks for the American Indians, or
even the Lakota, remains, as does the larger issue of the place of the
American Indian in American society. The Wounded Knee trial did,
however, bring about a better understanding of the Sioux and the issues
they have raised. Political trials confront tangled issues, tied in tight
knots. While a trial might not untie the knot, but only cut it, our reflection on the knot in front of us will help us to understand the next one
much better. Hard cases, the adage has it, make bad law. Nevertheless,
hard political cases make a better understood society.
69 L STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE 130 (1941).
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In every criminal trial, whether for prostitution, driving while intoxicated, theft, rape, or murder, public order is at stake, as is one individual's liberty. This tension between society and the individual is
rooted in both criminal law and religion, twins at birth and throughout
their growth. It is far from an accident that the Christian liturgy and
courtroom ritual have so much in common: beginning with an invocation of authority, followed by the entrance of a judge or priest in a robe
signifying a special office, continuing with indictments and proclamations, confession of transgressions, the central issue of guilt, reliance on
oaths and witnesses to the truth, and concluding with judgments and
sanctions. It is interesting to note that the word sanction in law means
punishment, but that the roots of the word are in that which makes life
holy, which occurs in a civic sense when a judge passes sentence. Naturally and fortunately, there are crucial differences between criminal law
and religion, especially in the adversary system, but criminal law cannot
deny its origin in expiation.
A political trial involves these tensions and much more. Its agenda
(often more latent than manifest) includes, in addition to those inherent
in the criminal law, the tensions of our public identity, our myth of
history, and our sense of destiny. The contradictions which arise over
these issues intensify from trials of corruption, to trials of dissenters, to
trials of nationalists, and finally to trials of regimes. Like Charles I, no
defendant in a political trial is an ordinary prisoner. The atonement
sought by the public, represented by the judge, in a political trial
reaches further than in an ordinary criminal trial. The fact that Otto
Kerner was a judge and former governor rather than, for instance, a
corporation president, made his bribe-taking a threat to the integrity of
the public realm. The court, in imposing the sanctions of law, restored
that integrity. Likewise, the contradictions represented in the Armstrong trial involved more than arson and second-degree murder, just as
those in the Banks-Means trial went far beyond theft, disorderly conduct, and illegal possession of firearms. The added agenda in these, as
in all political trials, touches the fundamental dilemmas of politics: the
morality of war and of violent protest, the identity of a people and who
can speak in the name of that people.
All criminal trials touch society's fabric. Judgments about public
order and individual liberty made in ordinary criminal trials involve
everyone. The texture of civility in everyday life is woven from such
decisions. Political trials go beyond this warp and woof of law to the
pattern in the public tapestry itself. That pattern, with all its unresolved contradictions, is the reason political trials become central moments for understanding nations and entire civilizations. The trial of
Socrates is the event through which we generally approach Athens and
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all ancient Greece. Socrates's Apology at his trial is one of the cornerstones in the tradition of enlightened thought and freedom of inquiry in
the liberal tradition. The trial of Jesus is, likewise, central to Christianity, and a foundation for the strength of religious feeling. Who would
write a history of France without devoting close attention to the trials of
Joan, Louis XVI, and Alfred Dreyfus? Are not the trials of John Peter
Zenger, John Brown, Sacco and Vanzetti, the Rosenbergs, the Chicago
Seven, and the Berrigans equally important for understanding America?
For an Irish nationalist, the words Robert Emmet spoke before he was
sentenced to death have come to have the same meaning as the Gettys70
burg Address does to an American.
"The ultimate foundation of a free society," in the words of Justice
Felix Frankfurter, "is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. . . .We live
by symbols."' 7 1 Political trials serve a free society by bringing together
for public consideration the basic contradictions which arise from the
clash of conflicting values and loyalties. The tensions over the relationship of the private to the public realms, the rightness of policy and of
dissent, the nature of representation, and the legitimacy of government
are all present in any political system. Especially in crises, these tensions
must be faced. Although the judgments in political trials do not resolve
these contradictions, it is important that they be raised. Generally, if
either side of the tension were to win and dominate, we would all lose.
This much we have known about such fundamental contradictions at
least since Aeschylus wrote his Oresteia. In the three plays of this cycle
justice is found neither completely on the side of the accused Orestes nor
completely on the side of the accusing Furies. Orestes was guilty of murdering his mother, and Athena knew it, but Athena also knew that the
angry vengeance of the Furies would not guarantee justice. She ended
the cycle of blood revenge in the House of Atreus by establishing a court
of law. In short and in conclusion, political trials within the rule of law,
while not resolving contradictions about the nature of society and history, do bring them into clear focus, and open the way for us to see and
accept the ironies of law, politics, and history.
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